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• According to economic theory, a highly
credible monetary policy helps to reduce the
degree of uncertainty surrounding the
objectives of monetary policy. Thus, when the
monetary policy pursued by the central bank
is credible, shock-induced ﬂuctuations in
inﬂation, interest rates, output, and
employment should be less pronounced than
in the absence of such credibility.
• The adoption of inﬂation control as a
monetary policy objective by some countries
in recent years has led central banks,
including the Bank of Canada, to take steps to
enhance the credibility of monetary policy.
• To date, most of the studies on this topic have
concluded that success in keeping inﬂation
within a target range has helped to increase
the credibility of Canadian monetary policy.
he efforts made by Canada and other coun-
tries to control inflation have led their
central banks to pay close attention to the
credibility of their monetary policy, particu-
larly during the last decade. A monetary policy that
targets low inflation will be credible if the public
believes that the central bank will take the measures
necessary to achieve this objective. Inﬂation expecta-
tions will then be closely linked to the objective
announced by the central bank.
Inﬂation expectations inﬂuence the negotiation of
future economic and ﬁnancial commitments. When
the expected, targeted, and observed rates of inﬂation
are the same and there are no longer any surprises in
terms of price, wage, and interest rate trends, then
transactions and exchanges among economic agents
will proceed as was anticipated when the initial deci-
sion was made, and, hence, the economy's perform-
ance will be improved.
This article looks at the concept of credibility from
both the theoretical and practical viewpoints. It dis-
cusses the advantages of high credibility, with a par-
ticular focus on Canada's experience with explicit
inﬂation-control targets, and explains measures taken
by the Bank of Canada to enhance the credibility of its
monetary policy. It also reviews a number of studies
that have examined the credibility of Canadian mone-
tary policy over the past decade.
The Advantages of Credibility
The question of credibility can arise in two distinct sit-
uations: the ﬁrst is a case where the inﬂation rate has
exceeded a certain threshold and the authorities
decide to reduce it, and the second occurs when inﬂa-
tion has been brought under control and the authori-
ties seek to keep it within the target range. In the ﬁrst
case, the authorities have lost their credibility because
they have been unable to prevent the situation from
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deteriorating, perhaps because of a highly tenuous
link between the operational objective of monetary
policy and inﬂation. It is then up to the authorities to
prove that they have both the determination and the
ability to correct the situation. In the second case, the
central bank has already proven its ability to reduce
inﬂation, and the question of credibility relates essen-
tially to whether it can maintain the inﬂation rate
within the announced target range. While the ﬁrst sit-
uation is of interest from a theoretical viewpoint, the
following analysis deals essentially with the second
situation, which reﬂects Canada’s experience with the
use of inﬂation-control targets since 1992.
When a central bank attempts to bring about a perm-
anent reduction in an already moderate inﬂation rate,
a credible monetary policy will make it easier to move
to the new regime. If credibility is low, and if the pub-
lic expects the central bank to abandon its efforts
before it has achieved its objective, price and salary
trends will adjust only gradually to the slowdown in
aggregate demand caused by the disinﬂation process.
A high degree of credibility, on the other hand, will
speed up the transition to the targeted inﬂation rate,
because economic agents will give greater weight to
this rate in setting wages and prices.1
A high degree of credibility will also help to keep
inﬂation close to target when unforeseen events dis-
rupt the behaviour of prices. Indeed, inﬂation control
is not a precise art, and the inﬂation rate may diverge
from the target rate at any time because of events
beyond the control of the central bank. In such a situa-
tion, credibility will help to keep expectations focused
on the target. If the public knows that the central bank
will do its best to bring inﬂation back to target, then
expectations will not react so strongly to ﬂuctuating
price trends, and this will tend to reduce the ampli-
tude of ﬂuctuations in the inﬂation rate, in output, and
in interest rates.2
Moreover, high credibility allows the monetary
authorities to make a more accurate judgment of the
economy’s capacity to produce goods and services
and to generate employment without automatically
1. In practice, a ﬁrst announcement of disinﬂation may have no beneﬁcial
effect on a central bank's credibility. Credibility will rise only after the central
bank has shown its determination and its ability to reduce the inﬂation rate
and to keep it at the targeted level.
2. This hypothesis is supported in a simulation study by Amano, Coletti, and
Macklem (1999), which concludes that a gain in credibility can help reduce
ﬂuctuations in the inﬂation rate, interest rates, and output and, at the same
time, (given the non-linear relationship they assume between inﬂation and
the output gap) raise the average level of output.
sparking new inﬂation fears. This is a considerable
advantage, given the high degree of uncertainty that
surrounds estimates of potential output and the out-
put gap.
Why Is It So Difﬁcult for a Central
Bank to Increase Its Credibility?
The term "credibility" refers to the degree of conﬁ-
dence that the public has in the central bank's determi-
nation and ability to meet its announced objectives.
This means that the incentives for the central bank to
stick to an announced policy must be signiﬁcant and
steady.
Mishkin (1997) illustrates the notion of credibility by
drawing a parallel to a situation familiar to many par-
ents. When in a public place, parents are always
tempted to yield to the whims of a child, rather than
risk a potentially embarrassing outburst, while telling
the child sternly that this is the last time and there will
be no such yielding in the future. But over the long
run, this attitude becomes counterproductive, because
the child will come to expect its parents to yield once
again, and thus the child will become more and more
demanding. The parents’ threat not to yield anymore
is simply not credible in the eyes of the child. In such a
situation, the parents’ threat is “time inconsistent," an
expression used to describe an attitude or policy that
may be considered desirable under the immediate cir-
cumstances but that can be harmful in the long run
because it causes the situation to deteriorate.
The notion of time inconsistency was ﬁrst applied to
monetary analysis by Kydland and Prescott (1977).
From the perspective of monetary policy, the time-
inconsistency problems arise when the public believes
that the central bank is unlikely to achieve all of its
announced objectives because they are perceived to be
incompatible. Most central banks have a mandate to
preserve the purchasing power of money and to keep
the economy in good health. While these objectives
may be consistent in the long run,3 they may not be
compatible over shorter horizons because of the rela-
tionship between the strength of aggregate demand,
inﬂation, and inﬂation expectations.4  The authorities
can improve the prospects of achieving their inﬂation
3. Since the effects of monetary policy on economic activity are only tempo-
rary, any attempt by the central bank to make the economy produce beyond
its capacity will lead to higher inﬂation in the long run, with no lasting
increase in employment and output.
4. Macklem (1997) offers a detailed examination of this relationship.13 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2000
objectives by acting in such a way that the public’s
expectations of inﬂation coincide with the announced
inﬂation objective.  Once the authorities believe that
expectations are ﬁrmly anchored to the target rate,
however, they may be tempted to give the economy a
sharper boost than the public expects. The public will
then make its economic and ﬁnancial decisions on the
expectation that the inﬂation rate will be higher than
announced, in order to guard  against the erosion of
both wages and returns from investment that would
result if inﬂation were to be higher than forecast.
How Can Credibility Be Improved?
To increase credibility, the monetary authorities must
persuade the public that their objectives are not
incompatible. Furthermore, if policy-makers are to do
everything in their power to reinforce and preserve
credibility, the cost of failing to meet their objectives
must be high. Studies on the credibility of monetary
policy have put forward some interesting proposals
on these points.
One way to enhance the credibility of monetary policy
is to appoint as governor of the central bank an indi-
vidual who is recognized as having an inﬂation-toler-
ance threshold that is lower than the public’s.5 In such
cases, inﬂationary pressures caused by excess demand
will not affect expectations, because the public is con-
ﬁdent that the central bank will take steps to counter
those pressures. Yet, in a democratic society it is not
necessarily appropriate, or desirable, to appoint a gov-
ernor whose inﬂation tolerance differs sharply from
that of the public.6 In fact, the credibility of monetary
policy might, thereby, be threatened.
Another way of dealing with the problem of time
inconsistency is to negotiate an ofﬁcial and public
agreement between the government and the central
bank on an explicit target for inﬂation.7  In this way,
the authorities will have greater accountability. The
government and the central bank will declare
5. This possibility was ﬁrst raised by Rogoff (1985).
6.  See Laidler (1997).
7. In the case of New Zealand, such an agreement was enshrined in law—the
Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act of 1989.  This gave the central bank the
mandate to formulate and implement a monetary policy for achieving and
maintaining general price stability.  Moreover, the act stipulates that the per-
formance of the central bank governor will be assessed in light of this objec-
tive, and dismissal could result if inﬂation targets are not met. See Walsh
(1996) for a discussion of New Zealand's experience with inﬂation targets.
themselves jointly responsible for achieving the
monetary policy objective, and the central bank will
implement the appropriate strategy. Knowing that the
central bank must pursue the stated objective, the
public will adjust its inﬂation expectations
accordingly.
Established targets represent an implicit contract
between the central bank and the public, and the
central bank will have to answer to the public for its
actions and their results. Moreover, explicit targets
give the public a concrete frame of reference for for-
mulating inﬂation expectations and for assessing the
effectiveness of monetary policy. As well, targets will
encourage the central bank to be more open and more
transparent in its operations.
However, a strategy based on explicit inﬂation-control
targets brings along with it certain risks. As noted
above, it takes several quarters before monetary pol-
icy actions affect inﬂation, and the inﬂation rate can be
disrupted at any time by unforeseen events that make
control particularly difﬁcult. These two factors also
complicate any assessment of the central bank's suc-
cess and could damage its credibility, since it will then
be difﬁcult to determine to what extent the outcome is
attributable to the central bank's actions, or to other
indiscernible factors. The central bank can ease this
problem through an effective communications pro-
gram that will clearly explain to the public why the
measures it has taken are consistent with the
announced objective.
Since the ultimate goal of inﬂation-control targets is to
promote a healthy economy, economic performance is
a decisive factor in achieving and preserving the cred-
ibility of monetary policy. If the economy experiences
a prolonged downturn because of events beyond the
control of monetary policy, credibility may be compro-
mised even if the central bank takes appropriate meas-
ures to achieve the announced objective.8 Indeed, that
objective could become the focus of a public debate
that might induce the government to abandon its
stance.  The credibility of monetary policy can be
established only after a fairly long period of time
characterized by an inﬂation rate that is close to the
target and by a sound performance of both
employment and output.
8. See Drazen and Masson (1994).14 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2000
Canada’s Situation
For several years, the Bank of Canada has been work-
ing to develop a program that will help it achieve its
inﬂation-control objective.
Besides making clear the authorities’ determination to
bring inﬂation gradually under control, the explicit
targets adopted by the Bank of Canada and the Cana-
dian government in 1991 were intended to reinforce
the credibility of the price-stability objective. This
objective had been previously announced by the Bank
on several occasions but had never been accompanied
by a speciﬁc commitment in terms of the inﬂation rate.
The announcement of explicit targets in 1991 was,
therefore, intended to clarify and conﬁrm the commit-
ment to price stability while providing the public with
a frame of reference for monitoring and assessing
progress towards this goal.
The setting of inﬂation targets marked the beginning
of considerable progress in terms of transparency and
in holding the Bank accountable for its decisions. This
strategy led the Bank to seek better communication
with the public and to open discussion on ways to
achieve price stability.
Since adopting inﬂation targets, the Bank has under-
taken a program to keep the public informed of its
monetary policy objectives and to explain how its
actions are consistent with those objectives. This pro-
gram has given rise to the following initiatives9:
• The Monetary Policy Report, launched in May 1995,
appears each May and November, and a formal
update of that report will be published each
February and August, beginning February 2000.
• The Bank has initiated a great many communi-
cations activities all across Canada. The Bank’s
managers and regional representatives explain to
the public the objectives of monetary policy and
the means for achieving them.
• Since 1994, the overnight interest rate has been
used as a short-term operating target and an
operating range has been established for this rate.
• The Bank Rate has been aligned with the
operating range for the overnight interest rate.
9.  Governor Thiessen has mentioned these initiatives in several speeches.
(See Thiessen 1995 and 2000.)
• Each time the bank changes its key rates, it issues
a press release explaining the reasons for the
change.
Evidence of the Credibility of
Canadian Monetary Policy
Any attempt to evaluate the credibility of monetary
policy must start with an assessment of inﬂation
expectations. Since these expectations cannot be
observed, they must be measured through estimation.
Trends in the exchange rate and in medium- and long-
term interest rates yield useful information about the
credibility of monetary policy. When targets are
highly credible, price increases above expected levels
should result in an appreciation of the Canadian dol-
lar and a negligible reaction in long-term interest
rates. Markets will believe that inﬂation is not going to
erode investment yields because they expect the Bank
to react to this unexpected surge and bring the inﬂa-
tion rate back towards the target. Based on their analy-
sis of exchange rate ﬂuctuations, Amano, Fenton,
Tessier, and van Norden (1997) obtained results that
suggest that Canadian monetary policy had been
credible since 1992. Similarly, in their analysis of long-
term interest rates, St-Amant and Tessier (1998)
obtained results that corroborated the credibility of
the targets.
Surveys of inﬂation forecasts offer another means of
gaugingmarket expectationsand assessing credibility.
Johnson (1998) used this kind of data to analyze sev-
eral countries, including Canada, according to
whether or not they had adopted explicit inﬂation
targets.10  He focused ﬁrst on the gap between the
forecast increase in the implicit price index and the
target rate for the 1991–96 period.  He next examined
forecasting errors for the 1984–96 period to assess the
hypothesis that inﬂation would be more predictable
the more credible the targets were.  His results
corroborate the hypothesis that the targets established
by the Bank of Canada for the period under
examination were credible.  But Johnson noted that it
is difﬁcult to determine the real contribution of targets
to reducing the variance of forecasting errors, because
the same results were observed for countries that had
not adopted explicit targets.  Perrier (1998) took the
statistical approach proposed by Johnson and applied
10.  Johnson used survey data from the publication Economic Forecasts: A
Monthly Worldwide Survey, which debuted in 1994.15 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2000
it to CPI forecasts from the Conference Board of
Canada's Survey of Forecasters.  The results of this
study, which examined the 1984–96 period, suggest
that Canadian monetary policy enjoyed a signiﬁcant
degree of credibility following the adoption of
inﬂation targets and that they have helped to make
the trend inﬂation rate more predictable.
The results of these studies may simply mean that
people have adapted their inﬂation expectations to the
sluggishness of the recovery from the 1990 recession
and to the international environment of weak and sta-
ble inﬂation that has prevailed for several years. John-
son (1997) proposed a methodology for distinguish-
ing the impact of policy announcements on expecta-
tions from the impact of business-cycle considera-
tions. He used the data from the Survey of Forecasters to
see whether announcements by the Bank of Canada
(some of which concerned target-setting) had the
desired effect on inﬂation expectations between 1988
and 1993. He concluded that some announcements
had, indeed, caused a decline in expected inﬂation
rates.
Chart 1 shows inﬂation forecasts from two surveys,
the Survey of Forecasters by the Conference Board and
the Consensus Forecasts from Consensus Economics.
The data from the Conference Board survey cover
inﬂation forecasts over a two-year horizon, while
those from the Consensus Economics survey have a
horizon of six to ten years. The chart includes an addi-
tional indicator of expectations—the spread between
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the yield on conventional 30-year Government of
Canada bonds and that on Real Return Bonds of com-
parable maturity.
These surveys suggest that expected inﬂation, which
stood at about 5 per cent in 1990, declined to around
2 per cent by 1999—i.e., to the midpoint of the inﬂa-
tion-control target range. Moreover, according to these
surveys, for the entire period during which the Bank
has had a target range for inﬂation, expected inﬂation
rates remained within that range. On the other hand,
the measure of expectations derived from the differ-
ence between the yield on conventional bonds and
that on bonds indexed to the consumer price index
suggests a much slower gain in credibility for the cen-
tral bank. According to this measure, expected inﬂa-
tion rates ﬂuctuated around 4 per cent for the 1992–95
period and fell outside the target range in 1994, sug-
gesting that the credibility of monetary policy was
rather weak. However, using this yield gap as a meas-
ure of inﬂation expectations is in itself problematic.11
In addition, the size of public deﬁcits during the ﬁrst
half of the past decade may well have created uncer-
tainty about the longer-term outlook for monetary
policy, and this would have been reﬂected in the yield
spreads.12  In any case, this measure of expectations
ﬁnally began to decline and ended up close to the
middle of the target range, where it has remained.  In
light of the inﬂation-expectations measures in Chart 1,
it is reasonable to think that explicit inﬂation-control
targets have enhanced the credibility of Canadian
monetary policy.
Chart 2 compares inﬂation expectations derived from
the Conference Board data with the performance of
the overall CPI. Note that, since 1992, the date set for
achieving the ﬁrst target, inﬂation expectations have
reacted very little to changes in the overall CPI, sug-
gesting that the targets have helped to focus inﬂation
expectations on the target rate and have thus
enhanced the credibility of monetary policy. In fact, if
targets were not credible, inﬂation expectations
should track changes in the CPI very closely. As the
chart shows, this is what happened in the period prior
to the adoption of targets.
Other, more descriptive, methods can be used to
obtain information on the credibility of Canadian
11.  See Côté, Jacob, Nelmes, and Whittingham (1996) for a full discussion of
this measure of inﬂation expectations.
12.  See Clinton (1998).16 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2000
monetary policy. Amano, Coletti, and Macklem (1999)
show that the life of collective wage agreements has
been growing longer in Canada and that the propor-
tion of such agreements containing cost-of-living
adjustment (COLA)clauseshassteadilydeclined.They
suggest that this may reﬂect the greater credibility of
Canadian monetary policy (Table 1). In addition, the
proportion of mortgages with terms in excess of ﬁve
years is higher than that observed during the 1980s,13
and many financial institutions have been offering
7- to 10-year mortgages in the last few years. Both of
these facts suggest that inﬂation targets have gained
credibility.14 Finally, the recovery in the corporate
bond market is a further indication of increased
credibility.15
13.  See Montplaisir (1996–1997, 41).
14.  Some banks are even offering a 25-year term.
15.  See Miville and Bernier (1999, 3).
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* The low point in 1994 reﬂects a cut in taxes on tobacco products.
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Conclusion
The preceding discussion has shown that a high
degree of credibility can facilitate the achievement of
policy objectives by dampening economic ﬂuctuations
and, more speciﬁcally, by diminishing the potential
cost of measures to achieve those objectives. The pub-
lic is aware that the monetary authorities may be
tempted to abandon their stated objectives for short-
term considerations, and thus the authorities should
put in place measures that will help establish and
maintain their credibility. In Canada’s case, these
measures were intended to increase the degree of
transparency at the central bank and allow the public
to assess the Bank's initiatives and achievements more
fully.
Most of the studies cited in this paper conclude that
the credibility of Canadian monetary policy has prob-
ably increased since inﬂation-control targets were
established. The authors of these studies have pointed
out, however, that it is difﬁcult to distinguish the spe-
ciﬁc contribution of these targets from the impact of
other factors—notably the decline in inﬂation itself.
The results obtained to date are only qualitative, but it
is reasonable to think that the public is paying increas-
ing attention to the targets set by the Bank and the
government when it comes to making economic and
ﬁnancial decisions.
Table 1
Selected Indicators from Major Wage Settlements
Period Average life of wage Proportion of wage
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